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Foreword 
Standard risk management deals with threats generated by exogenous events. Repetitive 
observations are used to characterize risk by a probability distribution that can be used for 
risk-decision support. Statistical decision theory, expected utility theory and the more general 
stochastic optimization (STO) theory provide common approaches for this purpose.  In 
contrast to standard risk management, security management addresses threats generated 
(intentionally or unintentionally) in multi-agent environment by intelligent agents, which may 
affect large territories and communities. An obvious example is terrorism. Less evident 
examples are floods which are often triggered by rains, hurricanes and earthquakes in 
combination with inappropriate land use planning, maintenance of flood protection systems 
and behavior of various agents. Other examples include: civil, social, energy, food and water 
security issues. Threats associated with such systems are usually affected by decisions of 
different agents, say an increase of biofuels production may change market prices, induce 
threats of environmental degradation, destabilize supplies of food and water and disturb 
natural environments. In contrast to classical situations such threats cannot be characterized 
by a uniquely defined probability distribution. Inherent uncertainties of complex 
interdependent systems with the lack and even absence of repetitive observations restrict 
exact evaluations and predictions. Future paths of these systems may be dramatically 
affected by old and new policies. The main issue in this case is the design of robust 
solutions. Although exact evaluations are impossible, the preference structure among 
feasible alternatives of policies, regulations, structures etc, provide a stable basis for 
comparative analysis. This is used in order to find solutions, which ensure robustness in the 
sense of maintaining functioning of systems, in the face of a vast variety of uncertainties.  
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a decision-theoretic approach to security 
management. It shows that robustness of solutions in security management can be achieved 
by developing new stochastic optimization tools for models with uncertain multi-dimensional 
probability distributions, extreme events and multiple criteria. One approach, using the 
common Stackelberg game is built on strong assumptions of perfect information about all 
agents and leading to unstable solutions and discontinuous models with respect to slight 
variations of initial data. Our proposed decision-theoretic approach does not destroy 
convexities but still preserves the two-stage structure of the Stackelberg “leader-follower” 
decisions. The paper analyzes problems of homeland security, electricity networks and other 
areas of systemic security and risk management. It provides an overview of existing relevant 
computational methods to be further developed and analyses promising new methods based 
on specific representations of uncertain probabilities.  
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to develop a decision-theoretic approach to security management of 
uncertain multi-agent systems. Security is defined as the ability to deal with intentional and 
unintentional threats generated by agents. The main concern of the paper is the protection of 
public goods from these threats allowing explicit treatment of inherent uncertainties and 
robust security management solutions. The paper shows that robust solutions can be 
properly designed by new stochastic optimization tools applicable for multicriteria problems 
with uncertain probability distributions and multivariate extreme events. 
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Risk, Security and Robust Decisions 
Yuri Ermoliev (ermoliev@iiasa.ac.at) * ** Detlof von Winterfeldt (detlof@iiasa.ac.at) * *** 
1. Introduction: 
 
Standard risk management deals with threats generated by exogenous events. Typically, such 
situations allow to separate risk assessment from risk management. Repetitive observations are 
used to characterize risk by a probability distribution that can be used in risk management. 
Statistical decision theory, expected utility theory and more general stochastic optimization 
(STO) theory provide common approaches for this purpose.  
Security management includes threats generated (intentionally or unintentionally) by 
intelligent agents. Obvious examples are threats to public goods and homeland security from 
terrorists [16]. Less evident examples are floods which are often triggered by rains, hurricanes, 
and earthquakes in combination with inappropriate land use planning, maintenance of flood 
protection systems and behavior of various agents. The construction of levees, dikes, and dams 
which may break on average, say, once in 100 years, create an illusion of safety and in the 
absence of proper regulations developments close to these constructions can create potential 
catastrophic events of high consequences.  
Other examples include social, financial, economic, energy, food and water security 
issues. Water and food security deals with the robust functioning of complex multi-agent water 
and food supply networks. Threats associated with such systems depend on decisions of 
different agents. For example, an increase of bio-fuel production may change market prices, 
induce threats of environmental degradation, destabilize supplies of food and water, and disturb 
rural developments.  
These examples illustrate threats that cannot be characterized by a single probability 
distribution. Inherent uncertainties of related decision problems with the lack and even absence 
of repetitive observations restrict exact evaluations and predictions. The main issue in this case 
is the design of robust solutions. Although exact evaluations are impossible, the preference 
structure among feasible alternatives provides a stable basis for relative ranking of them in 
order to find solutions robust with respect to all potential scenarios of uncertainties. As we know, 
the heavier parcel can be easily found without exact measuring of the weight.  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze specifics of decision problems arising in the 
security management. It shows that robustness of solutions can be achieved by using STO tools 
applicable for models with uncertain probability distributions, multivariate extreme events, and 
multiple criteria. Since the focus of CwU workshop is on broad audience, this paper avoids 
mathematical technicalities. In particular, it pays specific attention to motivations and 
clarifications.  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis ** Ukrainian Academy of Sciences   
* International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis ***University of Southern California                          
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In order to develop robust decision-theoretic approaches, sections 2, 3, 4 analyze 
similarities and fundamental differences between frequent standard risks, multivariate multi-
agent catastrophic risks with the lack and even absence of repetitive observations, and risks 
generated by intelligent agents. 
In the case of standard risks, the term “robust” was introduced in statistics [22] in 
connections with irrelevant “bad” observations (outliers) which ruin the standard mean values, 
least square analysis, regression and variance/covariance analysis. The mean is not robust to 
outlier, whereas the median is robust. Section 2 shows, that switching from quadratic (least 
square) smooth optimization principles in statistics to non-smooth stochastic minimax 
optimization principles leads to robust statistical decisions. This idea is generalized in the 
following sections. 
In general decision problems (section 3) under inherent uncertainty the robustness of 
decisions is achieved first of all by a proper representation of uncertainty, adequate sets of 
decisions and performance indicators characterizing socio-economic, technological, 
environmental, safety, security, equity, etc. perspectives. This leads to specific STO problems. 
In particular, a key issue is the sensitivity (singularity) of robust solutions with respect to low-
probability extreme events. Section 3 introduces similar to section 2 multicriteria versions of risk 
measures and new robust STO models applicable for managing systemic catastrophic risks 
involving multivariate extreme events.  
Section 4.1 analyses security management problems with several agents formulated as 
principal-agent or agency problems where a principal agent (PA) regulates performance of other 
agents in order to secure overall performance of a system [29], [34], [35]. These problems have 
features of a two-stage Stackelberg games, in which a ”leader” chooses first and a ”follower” 
chooses next, with full knowledge of the leaders’ decision.  The traditional formulation of the 
Stackelberg game is problematic because of the assumption about exactly known responses of 
agents and commitments of agents to these responses. Section 5 shows that this easily leads to 
degenerated responses of agents inducing instabilities and discontinuities even for linear 
objective and constraints functions of agents. Implicitly, such assumptions are also used in bi-
level mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints [6], [25], [27]. Section 4.1 discusses 
also serious limitations of Bayesian games. The use of Nash games (sections 6) destroys 
essential two-stage structure of principal-agent problems. Important stochastic bi-level 
mathematical programs are analyzed in [20]. 
Sections 4.2, 5 introduce concepts of robust decision-theoretic versions of the principle-
agent problem using the PA’s perceptions of agents’ behavioral scenarios and general 
stochastic and probabilistic maximin principles. Section 5 analyses systemic security 
management problems, in particular, preventive robust solutions in randomized strategies, 
defensive allocation of resources, and modeling of systemic failures and damages. Section 6 
discusses security of electricity networks. Section 7 analyses computational methods for 
problems with extreme events and uncertain probability distributions. Applications of these 
methods to security management can be found in [4], [39]. Section 8 concludes.     
 
2. Standard risks 
 
Standard risk analysis relies on observations from an assumed true model specified by a 
probability distributionΡ . Repetitive observations allow deriving the probability distribution Ρ  
and its characteristics required for related decision support models. A key issue in this case is 
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concerned with “bad” observations or “outliers”, which may easily ruin standard mean values, 
variance, least-square analysis, regressions and covariances [11]. [22], [26]. Therefore, 
traditional deterministic models using mean values may produce wrong results. The main 
approach in such cases is to use robust models which are not sensitive to irrelevant bad 
observations and at the same time, which are able to cope with relevant rare extreme events of 
high consequences.  
The term “robust” was introduced into statistics in 1953 by Box and received recognition 
after the path-breaking publication by Huber [22], although the discussion about rejection of bad 
observations is at least as old as the 1777 publication of Daniel Bernoulli. The straightforward 
rejection of outliers is practically impossible in the case of massive data sets, because it may 
also delete important and relevant observations. Huber introduced rigorous notions of 
robustness based on probabilistic minimax approach. Its main idea can be developed for 
general decision problems emerging in security management (section 4). By using appropriate 
neighborhoods of probability distributions (e.g. ε – contaminated probabilities, neighborhoods of 
imprecise probabilities) Huber derived robust estimates optimizing the worst that can happen in 
a specific probabilistic sense over the neighborhood of the model. In other words, robust 
statistical analysis is equivalent to switching from smooth least square optimization principles to 
non-smooth minimax STO principles. The mean is not robust to outliers, whereas the median is 
robust. The mean value of a random variable θ  minimizes the quadratic function 
 
)()()()( 22 θθθ ∫ −=−= dPxxExM ,       (1) 
 
whereas the median and more generally a quantile minimizes function 
 ∫ −−=−−= )()}(),(max{)}(),(max{)( θθβθαθβθα dPxxxxExQ ,  (2) 
 
with non-smooth random function )}(),(max{ xx −− θβθα , where P is a probability distribution 
function, and 0, >βα . This follows from convexity of functions )(xM , )(xQ . For example 
assume that P has a continuous density, i.e. M(x), Q(x) are continuously differentiable functions. 
Then intuitively we have 
 
0][Pr][Pr)(' =≥−<= xobxobxQ θβθα  
 
i.e., a solution x  of stochastic minimax problem (2) satisfies the equation [12], [15], page 95, 
[26], [36]: 
  
qxob =≥ ][Pr θ , βα α+=q .        (3) 
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Remark 1 (Uniqueness of quantile). If )(xQ  is not a continuously differentiable function, then 
optimality conditions satisfy analogue of (3) equations using subgradients [12] of function (2). In 
this case, equation (3) has a set of solutions. Quantile qx  is defined as minimal x satisfying 
equation qxob ≤≥ ][Pr θ . A slight contamination of θ  in (2), say by normal random variable, 
)1,0()1( Nεθε +− , makes )(xQ  strongly convex and continuously differentiable function [13]. 
The convergence of resulting quantile εqx  to qx  follows from the monotonicity of εqx , that is 
12 εε qq xx <  for 12 εε < .  Therefore, in the following we avoid using subgradients by assuming 
that equation (3) has a unique solution. For βα =  equation (3) defines the median.  
 
Remark 2 (Equivalent calculations of quantiles). It is easy to see that θαθβαα ExExxQ −−++= },0max{)()( . Therefore,  qx  minimizes also function 
 
},0max{)/1( xEqx −+ θ , βα α+=q .       (4) 
 
This simple rearrangement is used in section 3 to formulate robust STO decision support 
models applicable for security management. Formula (3) connects quantiles with a simple 
convex STO model (2). This became a key approach in risk management because direct use of 
quantiles destroys continuity of even linear performance indicators [14], page 9.  
Problems (1), (2) are simplest examples of STO models. Model (2) is an example of 
important stochastic minimax problems arising in the security analysis (section 4). Equation (3) 
shows that even the simplest case of such problems generates robust solutions characterized 
by quantiles. In general decision models under uncertainty, any relevant decision x  results in 
multiple outcomes dependent on x and uncertainty characterized by a scenario (event, random 
vector) Ω∈ω , where Ω  denotes a set of admissible states ω . For complex systems it is 
natural that different performance indicators should be used (see, e.g., [9], [11], [22]) to evaluate 
robustness of x  similar to the use of different indicators of health (e.g., temperature and blood 
pressure) for humans. This leads to STO models formulated as optimization (maximization or 
minimization) of an expectation function 
 ∫== Ω )(),(),()( 000 ωωω dPxfxEfxF       (5) 
 
subject to constraints 
 
0)(),(),()( ≥∫== Ω ωωω dPxfxEfxF iii , mi ,...,1= ,    (6) 
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where vector nRXx ⊆∈  and ω  in general represent decisions and uncertainties in time 
,...1,0=t , i.e., ),...)1(),0(( xxx = , ),...)1(),0(( ωωω = . Models with ex-ante and ex-post time 
dependent decisions can be always formulated [14], page 16, in terms of the first stage 
solutions x  as in (5), (6). Therefore, model of type (5), (6) allows to assess multi-stage dynamic 
trade-offs between anticipative ex-ante and adaptive ex-post decisions and the learning (section 
7.2) arising in security management (section 6). Random performance indicators ),( ωxfi , =i m,0 , are often non-smooth functions as in (2). In the case of discontinuous functions 
),( ωxfi , expected values )(xFi  of constraints (6) characterize often risks of different parts 
m,1  of the system [3], [13], [14], [28], [37] in the form of the chance constraints: 
ii pxfob ≥≥ ]0),([Pr ω , mi ,1= , where ip  is a desirable level of safety. Say, an insolvency of 
insurers is regulated with 210*81 −≈− ip , meaning that balances (risk reserves) may be 
violated only once in 800 years. In models presented in [9] these type constraints characterize a 
dynamic systemic risk of systems composed of individuals, insurers, governments, and 
investors.  
 
Remark 3 (Scenario analysis). It is often used as a straightforward attempt to find a decision x  
that is robust with respect to all scenarios ω  by maximizing ),(0 ωxf , s.t. 0),( ≥ωxfi , 
mi ,...,1= , for each possible scenarios ω . Unfortunately, a given decision x  for different 
scenarios ω  may have rather contradictory outcomes, which do not really tell us which decision 
is reasonable good (robust) for all of them. For example, models (1), (2) show that for any 
scenario ω  the optimal solution is ωω =)(x , i.e., the scenario-by-scenario analysis will not 
suggest solutions in the form of quantile (3). This straightforward scenario analysis faces 
computational limits even for very small number of examined decisions and scenarios, e.g., 
analysis of all combinations of 10 scenarios and 10 different decisions may easy require 1010  
sec. > 100 years.  
 
Models (1), (2) illustrate the main specifics of STO problems of the following sections. Objective 
functions (1), (2) are analytically intractable because in statistics the probability distribution Ρ  is 
unknown. Instead only observations of ω  are available. Analytical intractability of functions 
)(xFi  is a common feature of STO models. For example, even a sum of two random variables 
commonly has analytically intractable probability distribution although distributions of both 
variables are given analytically. Therefore, the main issue of this paper is the development of 
effective “distribution-free” methods applicable for different type of distributions [3], [14], [28], 
[37] and large number of decision variables and uncertainties (section 7). 
 
Remark 4 (Uncertain probabilities, Bayesian and non-Bayesian models). The standard 
stochastic optimization model (5), (6) is characterized by a single probability distribution Ρ , 
therefore can be defined as Bayesian STO model. When observations are extremely sparse or 
not available distribution Ρ  is elicited from experts [23], [33]. Yet, often it is difficult to identify 
uniquely probability Ρ . Most people cannot clearly distinguish between probability ranging 
roughly from 0.3 to 0.5. Decision analysis then has to rely on imprecise statements, for 
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example, that event 1e  is more probable than event 2e   or that the probability of event 1e  or of 
event 2e  is greater than 50% and less than 90%. Therefore only feasible sets of probabilities 
are identified by inequalities such as 21 pp > , 9.05.0 21 ≤+≤ pp . It is typical for models 
arising in security management (sections 4, 5). In such cases we may speak of non-Bayesian 
STO models., i.e. STO models which are not defined by a single probability distribution, but by a 
family of distributions with uncertain parameters or, more generally, by an uncertain distribution. 
Probability distributions depending on decisions are discussed in subsection 3.3. 
 
3. Catastrophic and systemic risks 
 
Standard “known” risks are characterized by a single probability distribution that can be derived 
from repetitive observations of ω . The essential new feature of catastrophic risks is the lack 
and even absence of real repetitive observations. Experiments may be expensive, dangerous, 
or impossible. The same catastrophe never strikes twice the same place. In addition, 
catastrophes affect different location and agents generating multivariate risks and needs for 
developing new STO models integrating risk reductions, risk transfers and risk sharing [9].  
As a substitute of real observations, so-called catastrophe modeling (catastrophe 
generators) is becoming increasingly important for estimating spatio-temporal hazard exposures 
and potential catastrophic impacts. The designing of a catastrophe model is a multidisciplinary 
task. To characterize “unknown” catastrophic risks, that is, risks with the lack of repetitive real 
observations we should at least characterize the random patterns of possible disasters, their 
geographical locations, and their timing. We should also design a map of values and 
characterize the vulnerabilities of buildings, constructions, infrastructure, and activities. The 
resulting catastrophe model allows deriving histograms of mutually dependent losses for a 
single location, a particular zone, a country, or worldwide from fast Monte-Carlo simulations 
rather than real observations [9], [38] 
 
3.1. Applicability of mean values, systemic risk. The use of different sources of information, 
including often rather contradictory expert opinions usually leads to multimodal distributions of ω  and random indicators ),( ωxfi . The mean value of such indicator can be even outside the 
set of admissible values requiring the use of quantile, e.g., the median of ),( ωxfi . 
Unfortunately, the straightforward use of quantiles destroys the additive structure and concavity 
(convexity) of model (5), (6), even for linear functions ),( ω⋅if  because, in contrast to the mean 
value )(∑≠∑ i ii i fquantilefquantile . This lack of additivity makes it practically impossible to 
use many computational methods relying on additive structure of models, e.g., dynamic 
programming equations and Pontryagin’s maximum principle. 
Equations (3), (4) allow the following promising approach for using quantiles. Let us 
denote a quantile of ),( ωxfi  by )(xQi , mi ,...,1,0= . Then we can formulate the following 
robust version of STO model (5)-(6): maximize 
 
)}(),(,0min{)( 0000 xQxfExQ −+ ωµ  
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subject to 
0)}(),(,0min{)( ≥−+ xQxfExQ iiii ωµ , mi ,...,1= , 
 
where 1>iµ  are risk parameters regulating potential variability of ),( ωxfi  below )(xQi , 
mi ,...,1,0= . Unfortunately the direct use of )(xQi  destroys concavity of functions )(xFi . This 
can be avoided by the following reformulation of the problem. According to model (2), equation 
(3) and Remark 2, the formulated above robust version of STO model (5), (6) can be 
equivalently rewritten in a similar to (4) form: maximize w.r.t. ),( xz  function 
 
}),(,0min{ 0000 zxfEz −+ ωµ ,        (7)  
subject to 
0}),(,0min{ ≥−+ iiii zxfEz ωµ , mi ,...,1= .     (8) 
 
For concave functions ),( ω⋅if  this is a concave STO model. The following Proposition 1 shows, 
that components )(* xzi , mi ,...,1,0= , solving (7), (8) w.r.t. z = (z0, z1, …, zm)  are quantiles 
)(xQi . Therefore, (7), (8) is a robust version of model (5), (6) where mean values iEf  are 
substituted by quantiles of indicators if  with a safety levels iµ  controlling their variability. In a 
sense, the model (7), (8) can also be viewed as a concave version of STO models with 
probabilistic safety constraints [3], [11], [14], [28] outlined in section 2. Equation (9) shows that 
model (7), (8) is defined by multicriteria versions of VaR and CVaR risk measures [36] 
controlling safety/security of overall system, i.e., a systemic risk. An alternative formulation of 
quantile optimization problems (subject to quantile constraints) and a corresponding mixed-
integer programming solution technique is considered in [32]. 
 
Proposition 1 (Quantiles of ),( ωxfi ): Assume ),( ⋅xfi , mi ,...,1,0= , have continuous densities 
(Remark 1); 1>iµ  , ),( ** xz  is a solution of model (7), (8) and 0),...,( **1* ≥= mλλλ  is a dual 
solution. Then for i = 0 and active constraints =i m,1 , 
 
iii zxfob µω /1]),([Pr ** =≤ , mi ,...,1,0= .      (9) 
 
Proof: Let }),(,0min{:),,( iiiiii zxfzxz −+= ωµωϕ . From the duality theory follows that *iz  
maximizes  
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),,(),,( *
1
**
00 ωϕλωϕ xzExzE m
i
iii∑+ = . 
Thus, if 0* >iλ , mi ,...,1=  then *iz  maximizes ),,( * ωϕ xzE ii . Therefore, from Remark 2 
follows equation (9) for mi ,...,1= . Equation (9) for 0=i  follows from the complementary 
condition 0),,(
1
** =∑= ωϕλ xzEmi iii  and formula (3).  
Let us also not that the variability of outcomes ),( ωxfi  can be controlled by using a 
vector of quantiles ),...,,( 10 iliii zzzz =  generated as in (7)-(8) by performance indicators 
∑ −+
l
iliilil zxfz })),(,0min{( ωµ , mi ,0= , where ...1 21 <<< ii µµ .  
 
3.2. Distributional heterogeneities. Extreme events. The following simple examples illustrate 
critical importance of quantiles to represent distributional characteristics of performance 
indicators. 
 
Example 1 (Annualization, temporal heterogeneity). Extreme events are usually characterized 
by their expected arrival time say as a 200-year flood, that is, an event that occurs on average 
once in 200 years. Methodologically, this view is supported by so-called annualization, i.e., by 
spreading losses from a potential, say, 30-year crash of airplane, equally over 30 years. In this 
case, roughly speaking, the crash risk is evaluated as a sequence of independent annual 
crashes: one wheel in the first year, another wheel in the second year, and so on, until the final 
crash of the navigation system in the 30th year. The main conclusion from this type of 
deterministic mean value analysis is that catastrophes are not a matter although they occur as 
random “explosions” in time and space that may destabilize a system for a long time.  
 
Example 2 (Collective losses). A key issue is the use of proper indicators for collective losses. 
In a sense, we often have to show that 
 100
1...11100 +++>> . Assume that each of 100 locations 
has an asset of the same type. An extreme event destroys all of them at once with probability 
1/100. Consider also a situation without the extreme event, but with each asset still being 
destroyed independently with the same probability 1/100. From an individual point of view, these 
two situations are identical: an asset is destroyed with probability 1/100, i.e., individual losses 
are the same. Collective (social) losses are dramatically different. In the first case 100 assets 
are destroyed with probability 1/100, whereas in the second case 100 assets are destroyed with 
probability 100100− , which is practically 0. This example also bears on individual versus 
systemic (collective) risk, risk sharing and the possibility to establish a mutuality. 
 
Model (7), (8) allows to analyze properly risk sharing portfolios involving both type of situations. 
In Example 2 the standard worst case scenario is identical for both situations, that is losses of 
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100 assets. Stochastic worst case scenario as in stochastic maximin problems (16) of section 
4.2 is determined only by extreme events, i.e., losses of 100 assets with probability 1/100. 
 
3.3. Unknown risks. A fundamental methodological challenge in dealing with catastrophic risks 
is the endogenous character of catastrophes. Catastrophic losses occur often due to 
inappropriate land use planning and maintenance of engineering standards. In these cases 
functions )(xFi  in (5) – (6) have the following structure: 
 ∫= ),(),()( θω dxPxfxF ii , mi ,...,1,0= . 
 
In other words, there is no single probability distribution defining the structure of functions 
)(xFi  for all x . Instead, there are probability distributions ),( θdxP , which are different for 
different decisions x . Therefore, this is a non-Bayesian STO model (Remark 4). Usually 
probability distribution ),( θdxP  is given implicitly by a Monte Carlo type simulations, which 
allow to observe in general only values of random functions ),( ωxfi  for a given x  (section 7.1). 
The decision dependent measure ),( ωdxP  may easily overthrow convexity. Fortunately, this is 
not the case with decision dependent measure defined as in (15) of section 4.2.  
 
4. Security management: principal agent problem 
 
Security management has essentially a multi-agent domain. The main source of uncertainty and 
risks is associated with behavioral patterns of agents motivated often and shaped by other 
uncertainties. In contrast to “unknown” risks of section 3 which can be characterized by 
catastrophe models, security management deals in a sense with “unknowable” risks dependent 
on decisions of agents. This section analyzes two ways to represent behavioral uncertainties: 
game theoretic and decision theoretic approaches.  
 
4.1. Game theoretic approach. The search for proper regulations protecting public goods is 
often formulated as the principal-agent problem [2], [20], [29] or Stackelberg game [34], [35]. 
Important issues concerns nonmarket institutions [1]. In rather general terms the problem is 
summarized as the following. The principal agent (PA) introduces a regulatory policy 
characterized by a vector of decision variables ),...,( 1 nxxx = . Other agents, which are often 
called adversaries, know x  and they commit to a unique response characterized by a vector 
function )(xy . The PA knows )(xy  and he knows that agents commit to )(xy . Therefore his 
main problem is formulated as to find a decision *x  maximizing an objective function  
 
))(,( xyxR           (10) 
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subject to some constraints given by a vector-function ),( yxr , 
 
0))(,( ≥xyxr .          (11)  
 
The game theoretic approach assumes that components of the vector-function )(xy  maximize 
individual objective functions of agents 
 
),( yxA           (12) 
 
subject to their individual feasibility constraints 
 
0),( ≥yxa ,          (13) 
 
where A , a  are in general vector-functions, i.e., in general, there may be many principals and 
agents. For the sake of notational simplicity, we will view them as single-valued functions. Since 
PA knows functions A , a , he can derive responses )(xy  by solving agents individual 
optimization problems. Since )(xy  is assumed to be a unique solution, then agents have strong 
incentive to choose )( *xy  afterwards, i.e., *x  is the Stackelberg equilibrium.  
This approach relies on the strong assumptions of perfect information that the PA has 
about the preference structure of agents and their commitments to a unique response )(xy . 
Section 5 shows that ))(,( xyxR , ))(,( xyxr  are non-convex and discontinuous functions even 
for linear functions ),( yxR , ),( yxr , ),( yxA , ),( yxa . This leads to degenerated solutions and 
sensitivity of solutions to small variations of data.  
 
Remark 5 (bi-level mathematical programming). A solution procedure for PA can be defined by 
solving bi-level mathematical programs [6]:  
 
maximize ),( yxR          (14) 
 
subject to constraints 0),( ≥yxr  and optimality conditions (for a given x ) for all individual 
models (12), (13).  
 
Example 3 (Bayesian games: Cournot duopoly). These games deal with situations in which 
some agents have private information. Therefore, agents make decisions relying on their beliefs 
about each other under certain consistency assumptions. The following example illustrates 
these assumptions restricting the applicability of Bayesian games for PA models.  
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The profit function of two firms are given as  
iijii xxx )( ωπ −+= , ji ≠ , 2,1, =ji . 
Firm 1 has 11 =ω , but firm 2 has private information about 2ω . Firm 1 believes that αω =2  
with probability p  and βω =2  with probability p−1 . Decision problem of firm 2 is to  
 
2212 )(max
2
xxx
x
ω−+ , 
 
which  has solution )(
2
1),( 1221*2 xxx −= ωω . Assume that firm 1 knows response function 
),( 21*2 ωxx , then its decision problem is to  
 
21
*
2111
*
21 )1),()(1()1),(([max
1
xxxxpxxxxp
x
−+−+−+ βα , 
 
which has solution ),,(*1 px βα  dependent on p,,βα . Assume that the private information of 
firm 2 is consistent with the believe of firm 1: firm 2 is type αω =2  (observes αω =2  before 
making decisions) with probability p  and βω =2  with probability p−1 . Only then firm 2 
(agent) has incentives to use decisions ),( *1*2 αxx , ),( *1*2 βxx . Therefore, the Bayesian games 
are applicable in the cases when firm 1 (PA) exactly knows the unique response function 
),( 21*2 ωxx  of firm 2 (agent) and the  exact distribution of agent’s uncertainties 2ω . For general 
model (10)-(13) Bayesian games require exact information about dependencies of functions A , 
a  on uncertainties ω  (say, functions ),,( ωyxA , ),,( ωyxa ) and probability distribution of ω , 
assuming also a unique response function ),( ωxy  solving problem (12), (13).  
 
4.2. Decision-theoretic approach. The game theoretic approach introduces behavioral 
scenarios of agents by uniquely defined known response functions )(xy . This raises a key 
issue regarding actual outcomes of derived solutions in the presence of uncertainty. The 
decision-theoretic approach explicitly addresses uncertainty based on PA’s perceptions of 
agents behavioral scenarios. These scenarios can be represented (see examples in sections 5, 
6) either by a set Π  of mixed strategies Π∈π  defined on a set of pure strategies Y , or by a 
set Y  of pure strategies Yy∈ . This leads then to two classes of STO models.  
Probabilistic maximin models associate robust solutions with distributions characterizing 
desirable indicators (say, social welfare function) over the worst that may happen from Π∈π , 
i.e., of the form: 
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∫= Π∈ )(),,(min)( dyyxfExF πωπ ,        (15) 
 
for some random function ),,( ωyxf , where ω  is an exogenous uncertainty.  
Stochastic maximin models of the  type (2) associate the robustness with respect to the 
worst-case random events generated by Yy∈ : 
 
),,(min)( ωyxfExF
Yy∈= .        (16) 
 
where Y may depend on ω,x . 
 
Remark 6 (Extreme events and robust statistics). Extreme values (events) theory analyses 
distributions of minimax (maximin) ),...,min( 1 nnM ξξ= , where nξξ ,...,1  is a sequence of 
identically distributed independent random variables [7]. The model (16) has connections with 
this theory: it focuses on random events generated by extreme values ),,(min ωyxf
Yy∈  with 
respect to scenarios Yy∈ . In other words, (16) can be viewed as a decision oriented analogue 
of the extreme events models with mutually dependent multivariate endogenous (dependent on 
decision variables x ) extreme events. The use of expected values in (16) may not be 
appropriate, i.e., (16) has to be modified as (7)-(8). Probabilistic maximin model (15) 
corresponds to minimax approaches introduced by Huber in robust statistics. The integral (15) 
with respect to an extreme measure ),( dyxΠ  indicates links to Choquet integrals used also by 
Huber for simple sets Π  of imprecise probabilities. The key issue is a proper representation of Π , that is discussed in section 7.  
Decision theoretic approaches aim to address uncertainties of agents responses )(xy . 
Namely, assumptions of game theoretic approach: 
 
- agents commit to a unique )(xy , 
 
- PA knows )(xy  and the commitments of agents and, hence, chooses x  maximizing 
function (10) 
 
are substituted by assumptions about the PA perception of agents scenarios. For example, the 
PA may use his perceptions ),,( ωyxA , ),,( ωyxa of real functions ),( yxA , ),( yxa  
“contaminated” by uncertain parameters ω . In this case random sets of agents scenarios 
),( ωxY  can be defined as  
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}0),,(:{),( ≥= ωω yxayxY . 
 
In other cases [39] these sets can be characterized by experts opinions combined with 
probabilistic inversions. The overall decision problem is formulated as multicriteria (multi-
objective) STO problem with random functions ),,( ωyxR , ),,( ωyxA , ),,( ωyxr , ),,( ωyxa . For 
example, it can be formulated as the maximization of function 
),,(/),,(min)(
),(
ωωω yxAyxRExF xYy∈=  or )],,(),,([min)( ),( ωωω yxAyxRExF xYy −= ∈  under 
constraints defined by functions ),,( ωyxr . This leads to stochastic maximin models (16). In 
general, function )(xF  may have the form ),,,,(min)(
),(
ωϕω yxRAExF xYy∈=  for some function ϕ , e.g., a welfare function RA )1( δδϕ −+= , 10 << δ  with economic perspectives of welfare 
analysis regarding possible transferable utilities, side payments, contracts, contingent claims. 
Definitely, in these cases insurance and finance supplement the safety measures and may 
mitigate many related problems besides prevention1
 
.  
5. Systemic security 
 
Under increasing interdependencies of globalization processes the protection of public goods is 
becoming a critical topic, especially against uncertain threats generated by agents. In rather 
general terms such problems can be formulated by using “defender-attacker” terminology. The 
agents can be intentional attackers such as terrorists, or agents generating extreme events 
such as electricity outage, oil spills, or floods by the lack of proper regulations, e.g., land use 
planning. The main issues in these cases concern coping with extreme events generated by 
agents directly and indirectly through cascading systemic failures. As a result, the security of the 
whole system can be achieved only by coordinated security management of all its 
interconnected subsystems, i.e., the systemic security management. In general, arising complex 
interdependent problems require developing new specific models and methods. This section 
and section 6 discuss some related issues.   
 
5.1. Preventive randomized solutions. This section analyzes situations requiring solutions in 
randomized strategies as in probabilistic maximin model (15). The simplicity of selected model 
allows easy to illustrate specifics of both game theoretic and decision theoretic approaches.  
The following model is a simplified version of the model analyzed in [34]. Consider a PA 
(defender) providing civil security say to houses ni ,1=  to prevent an attack (robbery). A pure 
strategy i  is to visit a house i , whereas ix  is portion of times the pure strategy i  is used in 
overall security control policy ),...,( 1 nxxx = , 1=∑i ix , 0≥ix . It is assumed that the agent 
(attacker) knows randomized strategy x  and commits to a randomized strategy 
))(),...,(()( 1 xyxyxy n=  maximizing his expected rewards: 
 
                                               
1
  We thank our anonymous reviewer for pointing on these issues.  
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∑=
ji
jiij yxryxA
,
),( , 1=∑ j jy , 0≥jy , nj ,1= ,     (17) 
 
assuming that the response )(xy  is a unique vector-function. Since PA knows the agent’s 
commitment to )(xy , the  PA maximizes his expected rewards  
 ∑=
ji
jiij xyxRxyxR
,
)())(,( , 1=∑i ix , 0≥ix , ni ,1= .    (18) 
 
The randomized strategy x  definitely increases the security of the PA. At the same time, 
the randomized strategy y  increases uncertainty about the agent.  
A discontinuity of )(xR  can be easily seen for 2=n , 2,1=i . The response function 
))(),(()( 21 xyxyxy =  maximizes 22221121221111 )()( yxrxryxrxr +++ , 121 =+ yy , 0, 21 ≥yy , 
and it has the following simple structure. Let )/()( 12112122 rrrr −−=α , then  
 
1 2 1 2
1 2
( ) 1, ( ) 0,
( ) 0, ( ) 1, .
y x y x for x x
y x y x otherwise
α= = < = =  ,       (19)  
 
i.e., ) )(,( xyxR  is a discontinuous function on the line 21 xx α= : 
 
11 1 21 2 1 2
12 1 22 2 1 2
, ,( , ( ))
, .
R x R x for x x
R x y x
R x R x for x x
αα+ >=  + <        
 
The deterministic game theoretic model (17), (18) relies strongly on perfect information 
about randomized strategies x , y . As a result )(xy  attains degenerated 0-1 values. It is 
natural to expect that formulations which take into account uncertainties will lead to more 
reasonable solutions. Consider first a straightforward generalization of model (17), (18). Instead 
of deterministic ijr , let us assume that the PA perceives agent’s rewards as random variables 
)(ωijr  defined on a set  Ω  of admissible probabilistic scenarios ω . In general, { })(ωijr  is a 
random matrix of interdependent variables. The PA uses now his perception of the agent model 
and can derive agent’s random response function ),( ωxy  by maximizing with respect to y   
 ∑=
ji
jiij yxryxA
,
)(),,( ωω , 1=∑ j jy , 0≥jy , nj ,1= .    (20) 
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Assuming that the PA still follows exactly the logic of model (10), (11), i.e. PA maximizes 
now the expected value 
 ∑=
ji
jiij xyxRExR
,
),()( ω ,        (21) 
 
where for the simplicity of illustration we assume that { }ijR  is a deterministic matrix. It is easy to 
see that this formal introduction of uncertainty into the game-theoretic model already smoothes 
function ) )(,( xyxR . Consider random variable ))()(/())()(()( 12112122 ωωωωωα rrrr −−= , then 
similar to (19): 
 
1),(1 =ωxy , 0),(2 =ωxy  with [ ]21 /)(Pr xxob >ωα , 
 
0),(1 =ωxy , 1),(2 =ωxy  with [ ]21 /)(Pr xxob ≤ωα . 
 
Therefore,  
 [ ] [ ]2122211221221111 /)(Pr)(/)(Pr)()( xxobxRxRxxobxRxRxR ≤++>+= ωαωα . 
 
Remark 7 (Non-concave and discontinuous models). If distribution of )(ωα  has a continuous 
density, then )(xR  is a continuous but, in general, non-concave function. Otherwise, )(xR  is 
again a discontinuous function purely due to the structure of the Stackelberg models, that is, in 
fact, meaningful only under perfect information about commitments of agents to ),( ωxy .  
 
Thus, the game theoretic approach orients PA decisions on unique best-case scenarios 
)(xy  or ),( ωxy  from agents’ perspectives, whereas the decision theoretic approach orients 
decisions on extreme random scenarios of agents from PA perspectives. In particular, the PA 
can take position to oppose the agent’s interests, i.e., to view perceived rewards ),,( ωyxA  as 
his losses. Therefore, the PA decision model can be formulated as the following stochastic 
maximin model: maximize  
 
),,(min)( ωyxfExF
Yy∈= , Xx∈ ,        
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where ),,(),,(),,( ωωω yxAyxRyxf −= ,  ∑ =≥= i ixxX 1:0 ,  ∑ =≥= i iyyY 1:0 . 
In general cases X  and Y  may reflect various additional feasibility constraints of agents. 
For example, Y  may represent prior information in the form of such comparative statements as 
the following: the agent plans to visit i  more probably then j , ji yy ≥  ; or the probability to visit 
objects i , k , l  is higher then objects k , m , n , s , t , i.e., tsnmlki yyyyyyy +++≥++ , 
etc. Sets X , Y  may include also budget constraints. In particular, if ic  is the cost per visit of 
location i , then the total costs should not exceed a given budget C , ∑ ≤
i
ii Cxc .  
Example 4 (uncertain distributions). It is essential that decision theoretic models can be 
formulated in a different case-dependent manner. Consider an important situation. Practically, 
the PA observes results of random trials i , j  from randomized strategies x , y  and he can see 
whether ji = , or not. If the information about rewards is not available, then the PA problem can 
be formulated as finding randomized strategy ),...,( 1 nxxx =  that “matches” feasible 
randomized strategy ),...,( 1 nyyy =  of the agent as much as it is possible. In this case, a rather 
natural way to derive optimal randomized strategy x  is by minimizing the function  
 
∑∈ i iiiYy yxx lnmax , Xx∈ , 
 
where ∑
i i
i
i y
x
x ln  defines the Kullback-Leibler distance between distributions x  and y . This 
distance is a concave in x  and a convex in y  function. A simple effective solution procedures 
similar in spirit to sequential downscaling methods [17] can be developed in the case of sets X , 
Y  defined by linear constraints.  
 
5.2. Defensive resource allocation. A problem of resource allocation for protecting public 
goods against attackers is demonstrated in [39] as an application of the stochastic minimax 
model (16). A typical setting is that the PA (defender) wants to minimize the perceived payoffs 
to the agents (attackers). In the following we shortly summarize this study advanced during 
2010 IIASA’s Young Scientists Summer Program.  
Suppose the defender is faced with potential attacks on a collection of targets (e.g., cities, 
critical infrastructures, public transportation systems, financial systems, energy or food supply 
systems, and etc.). The defender’s objective is to minimize the consequences from attacker 
choices. A Stackelberg game is usually used to model this situation when there is no uncertainty 
about the attacker preferences. In reality, the attacker’s preferences are not fully known to the 
defender. In the face of such uncertainty, the defender cannot predict the attacker’s best 
response for sure; therefore, a STO model is needed to minimize the perceived total 
consequences.  
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For simplicity, suppose the defender is faced with one attacker, whose decision is to 
choose a target i  among n  targets with the highest payoff to attack. The defender objective is 
to minimize  
),(max ωxgE i
i
 
where Xx∈  is the defensive resource allocation decision among targets under a budget 
constraint 
},...,1,0,|{
1
nixBxRxX i
n
i
i
n =≥≤∑∈= =  
for some 0>B , ),( ωxgi  is the perception of attacker utility function on each target. Therefore, 
this model focuses on extreme attacks (events) maximizing perceived utility of attackers (see 
also Remark 6). In general, this model also considers the interdependencies between multiple 
targets and agents if the agent’s utility functions depend on all components of x , ω . In 
particular, )()(),( ωω iii uxpxg =  is a product of target vulnerability (success probability) 
ii x
i exp
λ−=)(  
and the attack consequence  
im
m
j
ijji wAwu εω +=∑−=11)( . 
Note that in this model ),...,,,...,( 11 nmww εεω =  is a random vector representing all uncertain 
parameters in the attacker’s utility function, iλ  is the cost effectiveness of defensive investment 
on target i . For example, at the cost effectiveness level of 0.02, if the investment is measured in 
millions of dollars, then every million dollars of defensive investment will reduce the success 
probability of an attack by about 2%. 
It is assumed that consequences are valued by the attacker according to a multi-attribute utility 
function with m  attributes (of which 1−m  are assumed to be observable by the defender). ijA  
is attacker utility of target i on the j  th attribute, where ijA  takes values in [0,1], with 1 
representing the best possible value and 0 the worst, iε  is utility of the unknown (by the 
defender) m th attribute of target i , ),...,( 1 mww  are weights on the m  attributes, where 
1
1
=∑=mj jw  and mjw j ,...,1,0 =≥ .  
The inherent and deep uncertainty about agent behaviors is critical to models of protecting 
public goods. Solutions obtained in a deterministic model are usually unstable to even a subtle 
change in the agent parameters. The STO models are developed for robust solutions against 
such uncertainties. Therefore, quantifying uncertainty becomes an important task to provide 
input for the STO models. When direct judgments on the uncertain parameters ω  are available, 
the uncertainties can be quantified directly through probability distributions or simulated 
scenarios.  
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However, in some cases direct judgments are not available. For example, in the case 
study of defensive resource allocations against intentional attacks [39] available are only expert 
opinions about attacker’s ranking of cities (targets i ). Therefore, so-called probabilistic inversion 
is used to simulate scenarios about attribute weights and unobserved 
attributes ),...,,,...,( 11 nmww εεω = . In other words, if there are expert opinions on attacker 
rankings of potential targets, it is possible to probabilistically invert subjective distributions (as 
simulated scenarios) on the relative importance of targets attributes (e.g., expected loss or 
profits from attacks, population, national icon, difficulty of launching an attack, and etc), and 
even the characteristics of unknown attributes. 
 
5.3. Systemic failures and damages. The model of this section can be used as a module of 
systemic security management model. The main issues concerns the following. Such an 
“attack” involving different agents as catastrophic flood, financial melt-down, oil spill, or terrorists 
strikes may have direct and indirect long-term consequences with cascading failures and 
damages. Example 2 illustrates a vital importance of systemic damages distributions of which 
may significantly exceed the sum of isolated damages of related subsystems.  
The development of an appropriate model reflecting dependencies among failures, 
damages, and decisions of different subsystems requires special attention. An attack may 
produce a chain of indirect damages. For example, a rain affects simultaneously different 
locations of a region and may cause landslides and formation of damps, lakes; overfilling and 
breakdowns of dams may further cause floods, fires, and destruction of buildings, 
communication networks, and transportation systems. Fires may affect computer networks and 
destroy important information, etc. A failure in a peripheral power grid and financial organization 
may trigger cascading failures with catastrophic systemic outages and global financial crisis. 
The indirect losses can even significantly exceed direct impacts. Therefore it is important to 
develop a model capable of analyzing the propagation of failures through the system and their 
total direct and indirect impacts. In the following a simple model is described, which is related to 
notions such as random fields and Bayesian nets. Versions of this model have been used in 
studies of catastrophic risks at IIASA. The model distinguishes N subsystems or elements 
(buildings, infrastructures, locations, agents, etc.) Nl ,...,1=  of a system (region). Possible 
damage at each l  is characterized by random variable lς  assuming M  levels: for sake of 
simplicity M,...,2,1 .  Hence damages of the system are described by the random vector 
),...,( 1 Nςς=ς . A fixed value of this vector is denoted by z  and the set of all possible damages 
by Z . Let us denote by ltkp  the probability that the damage at l  is equal k at time t , ∑= =Mk ltkp1 1, 
0≥ltkp . Dependencies between subsystems are represented as a graph, where elements 
Ni ,...,1=  are nodes of the graph and links between them are represented by arrows between 
nodes. The dependency graph ),( UVG =  is characterized then by the set of nodes 
},...,2,1{ NV =  and the set of arrows (directed arcs) U . If nodes sl,  belong to V , Vsl ∈, , and 
there is an arrow from l  to s , then l  is an adjacent to s  node. Define as sV  the set of all 
adjacent to s  nodes and 
lV
z  is sub-vector of the vector of damages indexed by lV . For 
example, ),( 52 zzz lV =  for )5,2(=lV . 
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Damages lz  are described by a conditional probability ),|( xzzH lVll , i.e., damages at l  
depend on current values of damages at l and adjacent nodes as a function of available 
mitigation measures x . Let this function is known for each l . This is a common assumption of 
catastrophe modeling (section 3). Say, probability of a dam break is conditional on probabilities 
of potential discharge curves; the probability of inundation is conditional on a dike break; 
damages of buildings and other constructions are conditional on inundation patterns, and so on. 
In the same manner we can model, say, financial crisis spreading through regions. Functions 
lH  define the propagation of indirect events and related damages through the system 
according to the following relation 
)(),( 111,
ll
lV
ll V
t
V
Zz
V
t
V
t
l
ltl
k zPxzkHp =∑ === −∈ −+ ςςς , 
 
where )(, kPp tltlk == ς . To define completely the propagation of failures and damages it is 
necessary to fix an initial distribution of tlς  for 0=t , i.e., at the moment when the attack 
occurred. This equation together with initial distribution allow the exact calculation (under certain 
assumptions on the structure of graph G) of tlkp ,  for any 0≥t . Of course, for complex graphs it 
is practically impossible to derive analytical formulas for tlkp
, as functions of decision variables 
x . Hence the damages may have rather complex dynamic implicit dependencies on decision 
vector x  requiring developments of specific decision support tools. The most important 
approaches have to rely on STO in combination with fast Monte Carlo simulation as in section 
7.1. Paper [39] reports on computational effectiveness of these methods for realistic problems of 
security management with very large number of simulated scenarios and two-stage decision 
variables required for coping with extreme events. The values tlkp ,  reflect the dynamic of 
propagation of initial (direct) damages through the system after the occurrence of an attack. 
Scenarios of damages can be simulated at any 0≥t . For example, 0=t corresponds to the 
distribution of direct damages.  
 
6. Security of electricity networks  
 
This section presents a decision theoretic model for regulating electricity markets (networks). 
The California energy crises in 2001 and the collapse of ENRON raised serious concerns about 
proper regulation of the market power, that is, the ability of electricity suppliers to raise prices 
above competitive levels for a significant period of time. This is considered as a major obstacle 
to successful reforms of centralized electricity sectors to competitive markets [5], [40]. Leader-
follower type models are being used to support policy decisions on design of electricity markets 
and various regulatory tasks. Unfortunately, these models are usually inherently non-convex 
and sensitive to assumptions on their parameters. It is recognized [5] that no modeling 
approach can predict prices in oligopolistic markets, therefore the value of models is considered 
in their ability to provide robust results on relative differences of feasible market structure and 
regulations. Let us consider a model [40] where the independent system operator (ISO) controls 
the transmission system and generator outputs so as to maximize social welfare of consumers 
while meeting all the network and security constraints.  
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An electricity market can be represented by a set N  of nodes and a set of transmission 
lines. The strategic decision variables of the ISO are import/export quantities ir , Ni∈ , which 
must be balanced  
 
0=∑i ir ,          (22) 
 
and such that the resulting power flows don’t exceed secure thermal limits of the transmission 
lines in both directions 
 
li iill KrDK ≤∑≤− , Ll∈ ,        (23) 
 
where ilD  are distribution factors (parameters) which specify the flow on a line l  from a unite of 
flow increase at a node i .  
Given the ISO’s (leader) decisions ir , each producer (follower) i  maximizes the profit 
function  
 
)()( iiiiii qCqrqP −+ , ii qq ≤≤0 , Ni∈ ,      (24)  
   
where )(⋅iP , )(⋅iC  are the inverse demand function (wiliness-to-pay) and generation cost 
function; iq  are upper capacity bounds.  
The leader-follower models rely on the following perfect information assumptions: the ISO 
knows the response functions )( ii rq  and chooses ir , Ni∈ , maximizing the welfare function of 
consumers 
 
∑ 

 ∫ −+
i
rqr
iiii
iii
rqCdvvP
)(
0
)(()( .        (25)  
    
The resulting model is one-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. This type of model 
may have none or multiple degenerated solutions. There might exist also no-equilibrium in pure 
strategies due to non-convexity and even discontinuities in the welfare function (25). Slight 
deviations in )( ii rq , say due to volatility of price/demand functions )(⋅iP  may have significant 
consequences [5] on the market power mitigation and equilibrium.  
Another approach is to assume that the ISO is a Nash player that acts simultaneously with 
producers. This unilateral approach for regulation of network interdependencies ignores 
dependence of agents’ decisions iq  on regulations ir , that removes the non-convexity from 
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ISO’s optimization problem (22), (23), (25). Yet again, this approach requires perfect information 
about all producers, demand and system contingencies. It ignores uncertainties of fluctuations 
that stem from unforeseen events, such as demand uncertainty and transmission and 
generation outranges. The critical shortcoming of the Nash equilibrium is that it ignores the two-
stage character of the ISO and producers decisions. In particular, it excludes proper modeling of 
forward markets allowing participants to secure more stable prices reducing opportunities to 
manipulate the market.  
We shall now describe a two-stage STO model (see also section 7.2) in which the ISO 
determines its forward decisions under uncertainties at stage 1 (comprising possibly many 
random time interval), and producers act at stage 2 after a scenario of uncertainty is revealed. 
Let us consider a network affected by a set of random events (shocks) Ω∈ω  which are 
assumed to be elements of a probability space. These events lead to variability of functions 
),( ω⋅iP , bounds )(ωiK , )(ωiq , and cost functions ),( ω⋅iC . In general, these random functions 
and parameters can be viewed as ISO’s perception of producer’s model.  
In the presence of uncertainties the best ISO strategy would be a collective risk sharing 
maximizing the social welfare function of consumers and producers: 
 
 ∑=
i
ii rEfrF ),()( ω ,         (26)  
      
 
∫ −++= + ii
i
rq
iiiiiii
q
ii qCqrqPdPrf
0
),(),(),(max),( ωωυωυω , )(0 ωii qq ≤≤ , 
 
under constraints (22), (23). This is a two-stage STO problem as in section 7.2. Function )(rF  
orients regulatory decisions on achieving best possible outcomes with respect to all potential 
behavioral scenarios of agents (see also Remark 6).  
 
7. Computational methods  
 
A discussion of computational methods and applications of Stackelberg games can be found in 
[20], [25], [27], [34], [35]. Concept of Nash equilibrium smoothes the problem but it ignores 
essential two-stage structure of leader-follower decisions (section 6). Explicit treatment of 
uncertainty in PA models with bi-level structure is considered in [2], [20]. Paper [39] advances 
the decision-theoretic approach to homeland security models.  
The development of effective decision-theoretic computational methods essentially 
depends on specifics of arising STO models. The main issue is analytical intractability of 
performance indicators ),(),(),()( ωωω dxPxfxEfxF iii ∫== , where ).( ωdxP  may implicitly 
depend on x  as in problem (15) and Remark 4. If functions )(xFi  are analytically tractable, 
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then the problem can be solved by using standard deterministic methods. Unfortunately, this is 
rarely the case. In fact, standard deterministic models are formulated usually by switching from 
),()( ωxEfxF ii =  to deterministic functions ),( ωExfi . Simple examples show that this 
substitution may result in wrong conclusions as in section 3.2. More specifically, outcomes 
)exp( xω  for 100±=ω  with probability 2/1  have considerable variability, whereas 1)exp( =xEω .  
Instead straightforward evaluations of integrals )(xFi , STO methods [3], [4], [14], [28], [37] 
use only random values ),( ωxfi  available from Monte Carlo simulations. The following section 
outlines the main idea of these powerful methods which avoid the “curse of dimensionality” 
(Remark 3) and allow to solve problems which cannot be solved by other existing methods [8], 
[9], [19]. An important application of these methods for security management can be found in 
[39]. 
 
7.1. Adaptive Monte Carlo optimization. For the simplicity of illustration, let us consider the 
minimization of a function ∫= ),(),()( ωω dxPxfxF  without constraints.  
Computations evolve from an initial solution 0x . Instead of computing values of integral 
)(xF , what is practically impossible, the procedure uses only observable (simulated) random 
values ),( ωxf .  
For a solution kx  calculated after k -th step, simulate two independent observations 1,kω , 
2,kω  of ω  correspondingly from ),( 1,kkkk dxP ωηγ+ , ),( 2,kk dxP ω  and calculate values 
),( 1,kkkkxf ωηγ+ , ),( 2,kkxf ω , where kγ  is a positive number, ),...,( 1 knkk ηηη =  is a 
random vector with, say, independent identically uniformly distributed in interval ]1,1[−  
components. New approximate solution 1+kx  is computed by moving from kx  in direction of 
so-called stochastic quasigradient [8], [19]: 
 
k
k
kkkk
k
k
k xfxf ηγ ωωηγξ ),(),( 2,1, −+=        
 
with a step size 0>kρ . The convergence of kx  to the set of optimal solutions with probability 
1 follows from the fact that random vector kξ  is a stochastic quasigradient (SQG) of )(xF , i.e., 
)(]|[ kxkk xFxE ≈ξ . In other words, kξ  is an estimate of the gradient )( kx xF  or its analogs 
for nondifferentiable and discontinuous functions [8], [13], [19]. Step-sizes kρ , kγ  have to 
satisfy some simple requirements, e.g., kconstk /=ρ , ∞<∑ kk kγρ .  
This method simulates realistic adaptive processes. Only two random observations of 
function )(xF  are used at each step to identify the direction of transition from kx  to 1+kx  and 
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its size, whereas values of )(xF  and its derivatives remain unknown. In fact, changes of )( kxF  
can be relatively tracked, in a sense, by ),(1 1∑= =ks ssk xfkF ω  due to the convergence of 
)( kxF , ∞→k . This allows designing adaptive regulations of kρ  to speed up the 
convergence. Applications of fast Monte Carlo simulations usually require nontrivial analytical 
analysis [13] of involved stochastic processes. The next section outlines a version of the method 
that utilizes the analytical structure of ),( ωxf  to achieve faster simulations.  
 
7.2. Two-stage STO models. The robustness is achieved by two-stage structure of decisions 
combining both fundamental for coping with uncertainty mechanisms of anticipation and 
adaptation. Forward-looking anticipative decisions are made before new information about 
uncertainty become available, whereas other options are created and remain open for adaptive 
adjustments to potential new information when it becomes available. The two-stage STO 
problem [3], [14], [28], [37] as an attempt to incorporate both fundamental mechanisms for 
coping with uncertainty seems to be the most suitable for framing principle-agent decision 
models under uncertainty. An example of two-stage model is given in section 6, equation (26). 
Problem (2) has also two-stage formulation important for modeling the climate change dilemma 
[31]. A rather general two-stage STO model is formulated as follows. A long-term decision x  
must be made at stage 1 before the observation of uncertainty ω  is available. At stage 2, for 
given Xx∈  and observed ω , the adaptive short-term decision ),( ωxy  is chosen so as to 
solve the problem: find Yy∈ , such that 
 
0),,( ≥ωyxgi , li ,1= , and        (27) 
 
),,(0 ωyxg ,          (28)  
 
is maximized (minimized) for some functions ig , li ,1= . Then the main problem is to find 
decision x , such that 
 
),()( ωxEfxF = , )),,(,(),( 0 ωωω xyxgxf = , Xx∈     (29)  
 
is maximized.  
We can see that equations (27), (28) correspond to equations (12), (13) of the agents’ 
models, and (29) to the goal (10) of the principle-agent model. Computational methods for this 
general model are discussed in [8]. If ),( ωxy  maximizes (28), this problem corresponds to the 
(two-stage) recourse STO model; otherwise – stochastic maximin problem (16). In general, (29) 
may be (section 2) a dynamic two-stage STO model. Multistage STO models with more then 
two stages arise in cases when ω  remains unknown after new information become available.  
30 
 
In general, two-stage STO models (29) are solved by using adaptive Monte Carlo 
optimization [8] methods. The main idea can be easy illustrated by using the simplest stochastic 
minimax model (2). As in section 7.1, instead of integral ),()( ωxEfxF = , 
)}(),(max{),( xxxf −−= ωβωαω , the method sequentially updates an initial solution 0x  by 
using only available on-line independent observations or simulations 0ω , 1ω , … of random 
variable ω . Let kx  is an approximate solution computed at step ,...1,0=k . Observe (simulate) 
kω  and change kx  by the rule 
 
k
k
kk xx ξρ−=+1 , ,...1,0=k ,  , ,
, .
k
k kif x
otherwise
α ωξ β ≥=   
 
Again, kξ  is a SQG of non-smooth function )(xF  at kxx = . The step-size multiplier kρ  
satisfies the same type conditions as in section 7.1. 
 
7.3. Uncertain distributions. In this section we assume that ω  is characterized by a vector 
),...,( 1 mvvv =  of random parameters mRVv ⊂∈ . Analyzed in previous sections STO models 
can be formulated as maximization of the function   
 
∫==
V
vdHvxfvxEfxF )(),(),()( , nRXx ⊂∈ ,     (30) 
 
where mRVv ⊂∈  is a vector of random parameters, )(yH  is a cumulative distribution 
function, i.e., )()( vdHdvP = , and ),( ⋅xf  is a random function possessing all the properties 
necessary for expression (30) to be meaningful.  
As previous sections show, we often do not have full information on )(yH . For new 
decision problems, in particular, arising in security analysis, we often have large a number of 
unknown interdependent variables v , x  and only very restricted samples of real observations 
which don’t allow to derive the distribution P .  
Experiments to generate new real observations may be extremely expensive, dangerous or 
simply impossible. Instead, the natural approach for dealing with new problems can be based 
on using all additional information on P  to derive a set of feasible distributions.  
Let us denote by K  the set of distributions consistent with available information on P . 
The robust solution can be defined as Xx∈  maximizing 
 ∫ ∫== ∈ ),(),()(),(min)( dvxPvxfdvPvxfxF KP ,     (31) 
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where ),( dvxP  denotes the extreme distribution as in section 4. Thus, we have a general case 
of STO models with probability measure affected by decision x  as in sections 3.3, 7.1.  
Assume that in accordance with available sample and our beliefs we can split the set V  
into disjoint subsets },...,1,{ SsCs = . Some of them may correspond to clusters of available 
observations whereas others may reflect expert opinions on the degree of uncertainty and its 
heterogeneity across the admissible set V . For instance, we can distinguish some critical zones 
(“catalogues of earthquakes”) which may cause significant reductions of performance indicators. 
Accordingly, the additional beliefs can be given in terms of a “quantile” class 


 =∫ == SsdvPPK
sC
s ,...,1,)(: α ,       (32) 
 
where ∑ ==Ss s1 1α ; more generally – in terms of ranges of probabilities 
 


 =∫ ≤≤= SsdvPPK
sC
ss ,...,1,)(: βα ,      (33) 
 
where sα , sβ  are given numbers such that ∑≤≤∑ == Ss sSs s 11 1 βα . This class is considered as 
the most natural elicitation mechanism.  
Let us denote ∫=
sCs dvP )(γ , ),...,( 1 Sγγγ = . In general, additional beliefs can be 
represented in a form of various inequalities among components of vector γ  (see Remark 4), of 
the type 
 
}0,:{ ≥≤= γγ bAPK          (34) 
 
for some matrix A  and vector b .  
 
Proposition 2: For any function ),( vxf  assumed to be integrable w.r.t. all P  in K  defined by 
(34) 
 
∫  ∑ ≤= = ∈∈ Ss CvsKP bAvxfdvPvxf s1 |),(minmin)(),(min γγγ .     
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In the case of K  defined by (32), (33)  
 
∫ ∑= ∈=∈ ),(min)(),(min 1 vxfdvPvxf sCvSs sKP α , 
 
{ }
1 1
min ( , ) ( ) min min ( , ) | , 1
s
s
S S
s s s s sP K v C
s s
f x v P dv f x vγ γ α γ β γ∈ ∈== = ≤ ≤ =  ∑ ∑∫ . 
 
Proof:  We can choose a distribution P  concentrated at any collection of points ss Cv ∈ , 
Ss ,1= , therefore  
 
∫  ∑ ≤≤ = ∈∈ Ss CvsKP bAvxfdvPvxf s1 |),(minmin)(),(min γγγ  . 
 
On the other hand,  
 
∑ ≤≥∫ ∑ ∫= = ∈Ss Cvss C bAvxfdvPvxfdvPvxf ss 1 |),(minmin)(),()(),( γγγ . 
 
Proposition 2 reduces maximization problem (31) to deterministic maximin problems which can 
be solved by linear or nonlinear programming methods. There are important connections 
between dual solutions of these problems and CVaR measures discussed in sections 2, 3. 
 
7.4. Generalized moment problem. Often we know bounds for the mean value or other 
moments of H  in (30). Such information can often be written in terms of constraints 
 
∫ ≤==
V
kkk vdHvqvEqHQ 0)()()()( , lk ,1= ,      
 ∫ =
V
vdH 1)( ,           
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where the )(vqk , lk ,1= , are known functions. Let K  is the set of functions H  satisfying these 
constraints. 
Consider again the problem (31). Methods of maximizing )(xF  in (31) depend on solution 
procedures for the following “inner” minimization problem: find a distribution function H  that 
minimizes 
 
∫==
V
vdHvqvEqHQ )()()()( 000         
 
subject to KH ∈  for some function 0q . This is a generalization of the known moments problem 
(see, e.g., [10]). It can also be regarded as a generalization of the nonlinear programming 
problem 
 { }lkVqq k ,1,,0)(:)(min 0 =∈≤ ννν  
 
to an optimization problem involving randomized strategies as in section 5. 
There are two main approaches [10] for minimizing )(0 HQ  in K : generalized linear 
programming (GLP) methods and dual maximin approach. 
 
7.5. GLP methods. Minimization of )(0 HQ  in K  is equivalent to the following GLP problem 
[10]: find points Vj ∈ν , lk ,1= , 1+≤ lt  and real numbers jp , lk ,1= , tj ,1= , minimizing  
 
0
1
( )
t
j
j
j
q pν=∑           (35) 
 
subject to 
 
1
( ) 0
t
k j
j
j
q pν= ≤∑ , lk ,1= ,        (36) 
 
1
1
=∑=tj jp , 0≥jp , tj ,1= .        (37)  
 
34 
 
Consider arbitrary points jv , 1,1 += lj  (setting 1+= lt ), and for the fixed set { }121 ,...,, +lvvv  find a solution ),...,,( 121 += lpppp  of problem (35) – (37) with respect to p . 
Assume that p  exists and that ),...,,( 121 +luuu  are the corresponding dual variables. We know 
that if there exists a point *v  such that 0)()( 1*
1
*0 <−∑− += lklk k uvquvq , then the solution p  
could be improved by dropping one of the columns )1),(),....,(),(( 10 jljj vqvqvq , 1,1 += lj  
from the basis and replacing it by the column )1),(),....,(),(( **1*0 vqvqvq l , following the revised 
simplex method. Point *v  could be defined by minimizing ∑− =lk kk vquvq 10 )()( , Vv∈ . 
This conceptual framework leads to various methods [18], [21] for solving not only (35)-
(37) but also some more general classes of nonlinear (in probability) problems. The interesting 
important issue is the combination of the described procedure with simultaneous gradient type 
adjustments of x  ensuring optimal solution of compound problem (31).  
 
7.6. Duality relations. The duality relations for minimization of )(0 HQ  in K  provide a more 
general approach. It can be shown that if V  is compact, )(vqk , lk ,0= , are continuous and 
coint0∈ { })(),...,(),((: 10 vqvqvqzz l= , Vv∈ , then  
 
 ∑−∫ = =∈∈∈ + mk kkVvUuKH vquvxfvdHvxf 1 )(),(minmax)(),(min     (38) 
 
for each Xx∈ , where ),( ⋅xf  is a continuous function. Hence, original infinite dimensional STO 
problem can then be reduced to finite-dimensional a maximin type problem as follows: maximize 
the function 
 
 ∑−= =∈ mk kkVv vquvxfux 1 )(),(min),(γ        (39) 
 
with respect to Xx∈ , 0≥u . This allows developing a number of algorithms using GLP 
approach and algorithms based on solving directly maximin problem (39). A general scheme of 
such an algorithms is the following.  
 
7.7. Stochastic procedure. According to (38), (39) the STO model with uncertain distribution is 
reduced to a finite-dimensional maximin problem with a possibly non-convex inner problem of 
minimization and a concave final problem of maximization. A vast amount of work has been 
35 
 
done on maximin problems but virtually all of the existing methods fail if the inner problem is 
non-convex. The following approach allows to overcome this difficulty.  
 
Consider a general maximin problem  
 
),(minmax vxg
VvXx ∈∈ ,          
where ),( vxg  is a continuous function of ),( vx  and a concave function of x  for each Vv∈ , 
nRX ⊂ , mRV ⊂ . Although ),(min)( vxgxG
Vv∈=  is a concave function, to compute its value 
requires a solution )(xv  of non-convex problem. In order to avoid the difficulties involved in 
computing )(xv  one could try to approximate V  by an ε  - set.  
But, in general, this would require a set containing a very large number of elements. An 
alternative is to use the following ideas [10]. Consider a sequence of sets sV , ,...1,0=s  and the 
sequence of functions ),(min)( vxgxG
sVv
s ∈= . It can be proven that, under natural assumptions 
concerning the behavior of sequence sG , the sequence of points generated by the rule 
 
)(1 ssxsss xGxx ρ−=+ , ),()( ssxssx vxgxG = , ,...1,0=s ,     
 
where the step size sρ  satisfies assumptions such as 0≥sρ , 0→sρ , ∞=∑∞=0s sρ , tends to 
follow the time-path of optimal solutions: for ∞→s  
 [ ] 0)(max)(lim =− xGxG sss . 
 
It was shown (see discussion in [10]) how sV  (which depends on sx ) can be chosen so 
that we obtain the convergence 
 
)(min)(min xGxG s → , 
 
where sV  contains only a finite number 2≥sN  of random elements. The main idea is the 
following.  
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We start by choosing initial points 0x , 0v , a probability distribution µ  on set V  and an 
integer 10 ≥N . Suppose that after the s -th iteration we have arrived at points sx , sv . The next 
approximations 1+sx , 1+sv  are then constructed in the following way. Choose 1≥sN  
points 1,sv , 2,sv , …, sNsv , , which are sampled from the distribution µ , and determine the set  
 { } 0,,2,1, ,...,, sNssss vvvvV s = , 
where ss vv =0, . Take ),(max1 νν sVs xgArgv s∈+ =  and compute  
 [ ]),( 11 ++ −= ssxssXs vxgxx ρπ , ,...1,0=s , 
 
where sρ  is the step size and Xπ  is the result of the projection operation on X . The 
convergence analysis of this method can be found in [10]. 
 
8. Concluding remarks  
 
In the case of perfect information the best response of the follower to a decision x  of the 
leader is the decision )(xy  maximizing his reward ),( yxA . Therefore, the best decision of the 
leader is *xx =  maximizing his rewards ))(,( xyxR . Since )(xy  is assumed to be a unique 
solution, then the follower has strong incentive to choose )( *xy  afterwards, i.e., *x  is the 
Stackelberg equilibrium.  
In the case of uncertainty the situation is different. The leader may again use the best 
response ),( ωxy  of the follower according to his perception of uncertainty ω  and rewards 
),,( ωyxA  of the follower. However, the decision ),( ωxy  is no longer rational for the follower to 
choose afterwards. In addition, as Remark 7 indicates, it may produce degenerated solutions 
),( ωxy  resulting in discontinuities and instabilities. Therefore, in the case of uncertainty the 
proposed decision-theoretic approach relies on random extreme scenarios for the leader rather 
than random best case scenarios for the follower. This preserves convexities of models and it 
allows the introduction of concepts of robust solutions based on new type of non-Bayesian 
multicriteria STO models with uncertain probability distributions and multivariate extreme 
events. As section 7 shows, specific classes of such models can be solved by linear and 
nonlinear programming methods in the case of price-wise linear random functions. An important 
food security case study in [4] was analyzed by linear programming methods in an extended 
space of proposed two-stage multi-agent STO model. In general, adaptive fast Monte Carlo and 
SQG optimization methods can be used [20], [39] to solve arising STO models. Developments 
of tools for solving STO problems involving implicit dynamic dependencies of probabilities on 
decisions in section 5.3 demand special attention. Truly systemic security management is 
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required for coping with systemic failures and extreme events generating disruptions of financial 
and economic systems, communication and information systems, food-water-energy supply 
networks.  
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